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A Novel Hybrid Method to Analyze Security Vulnerabilities in
Android Applications
Junwei Tang, Ruixuan Li , Kaipeng Wang, Xiwu Gu, and Zhiyong Xu
Abstract: We propose a novel hybrid method to analyze the security vulnerabilities in Android applications. Our
method combines static analysis, which consists of metadata and data flow analyses with dynamic analysis, which
includes dynamic executable scripts and application program interface hooks. Our hybrid method can effectively
analyze nine major categories of important security vulnerabilities in Android applications. We design dynamic
executable scripts that record and perform manual operations to customize the execution path of the target application.
Our dynamic executable scripts can replace most manual operations, simplify the analysis process, and further verify
the corresponding security vulnerabilities. We successfully statically analyze 5547 malwares in Drebin and 10 151
real-world applications. The average analysis time of each application in Drebin is 4.52 s, whereas it reaches 92.02 s
for real-word applications. Our system can detect all the labeled vulnerabilities among 56 labeled applications.
Further dynamic verification shows that our static analysis accuracy approximates 95% for real-world applications.
Experiments show that our dynamic analysis can effectively detect the vulnerability named input unverified, which is
difficult to be detected by other methods. In addition, our dynamic analysis can be extended to detect more types of
vulnerabilities.
Key words: Android security; vulnerability analysis; static analysis; dynamic analysis
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Introduction

Android devices have accounted for more than 80% of
the world’s smartphone market in recent years. The
number of Android apps is also reaching millions.
Various types of applications substantially enrich our
daily life but could also bring new security concerns
regarding sensitive information. Given that mobile
phones contain substantial users’ private information,
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private data may be leaked by malicious applications or
applications with security vulnerabilities.
The analysis of application vulnerability is normally
applied to detect the security vulnerabilities incurred by
poor development or other reasons. These vulnerabilities
may be used by attackers to achieve denial of service
attacks, privilege promotion, application data, and user
privacy disclosure, resulting in huge losses to ordinary
users. Compared with traditional desktop applications,
Android applications carry more private information of
individual users and are more easily targeted by attackers.
With such a large number of Android devices and
applications, how to accurately detect various types of
security vulnerabilities in Android applications remains
a valuable research topic.
Several existing approaches can analyze certain
categories of vulnerabilities in detail, but cannot
be applied to other types of vulnerabilities. Certain
approaches can only detect industry-specific application
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vulnerabilities, whereas others are based on a specific
kind of single static code analysis, which may feature
low accuracy and high false positives. Currently, several
dynamic analysis methods have been proposed to detect
Android application’s vulnerabilities based on fuzzy test
and sandbox, which also exhibit their own disadvantages.
Specific dynamic analysis methods are limited to a small
category of vulnerabilities[1] and cannot be extended to
the detection of more common vulnerability categories.
Other methods require operating system modification[2] ,
their configuration environment is very complex and
the results are inconvenient to analyze. In addition, the
system overhead would be notably large.
To solve the above problems, we propose a novel
hybrid approach to conveniently and accurately detect
important types of security vulnerabilities in Android
applications. We take advantage of static and dynamic
analyses. We combine metadata analysis with data
flow analysis during our static analysis process. Our
dynamic detection engine is based on automated
executable scripts and Application Program Interface
(API) hooks. Our dynamic executable scripts can
improve the efficiency of dynamic analysis and increase
the types of detected vulnerabilities. In addition, these
dynamic executable scripts can customize the execution
path of the target application instead of the fuzzy test
and complete the runtime state analysis of the target
application in accordance with its real-time response in
collaboration with API hooks.
On the basis of the defined vulnerability judgment
rules, the above analysis processes generate vulnerability
analysis results for the target application. Then, we can
systematically analyze the important security risks of
Android applications.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We propose a novel hybrid method, which
combines static and dynamic analysis approaches, to
analyze security vulnerabilities in Android applications.
The static analysis consists of metadata and data flow
analyses, whereas the dynamic analysis is based on
dynamic executable scripts and API hooks.
(2) The dynamic executable scripts can avoid
most manual operations, simplify the vulnerability
detection process, and further verify the existence
of corresponding security vulnerabilities. The script
generation module generates a corresponding executable
script based on manual operations. After updating the
basic script, it is convenient to verify and detect the
vulnerabilities.
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(3) We perform successful static analysis on 15 698
applications, including 5547 malwares in Drebin[3] and
10 151 real-world applications. The average analysis
time of each application in Drebin is 4.52 s, whereas that
of each real-world application is 92.02 s. In addition, we
show the relationship between application vulnerabilities
and size.
(4) We implement a system using static and
dynamic analysis approaches. Among the nine types
of vulnerabilities analyzed by our system, eight are
detected by static analysis, and one is handled by
dynamic analysis. Our system can correctly detect all the
labeled vulnerabilities in 56 test applications, and further
dynamic verification shows that the accuracy of our static
analysis approximates 95% for real-world applications.
Our dynamic analysis can detect the vulnerability named
input unverified, which is hard to be analyzed by static
analysis. The types of the detected vulnerabilities can be
enriched and extended in the future.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the background. Section 3 introduces our
system design and implementation. Section 4 presents
the evaluation. Section 5 discusses the limitations of the
study. Section 6 introduces the related work. Section 7
concludes the whole paper.

2
2.1

Background
Security
vulnerabilities
applications

in

Android

In Android platform, the situation of application security
vulnerability is as extremely serious as that of the
traditional software. Security vulnerabilities in Android
applications could lead to serious security consequences
as smartphones carry substantial sensitive user
information. Several features of security vulnerabilities
in Android applications are similar to those of traditional
desktop applications, but they show more difference
because of the new features of Android applications
themselves. For example, an Android application may
incorrectly or not use an encryption function at all
to directly transmit and process sensitive information
in plaintext. This condition can easily lead to privacy
leaks. In addition, if the components of an Android
application are exposed to other applications without
proper permission restrictions, a privilege attack caused
by unrestricted component vulnerability may occur.
Several of these vulnerabilities are related to the unique
structure of Android applications. Other vulnerabilities
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are due to the incorrect usage of APIs.
2.2

Instrumentation and Android test project

The Android test project is based on the instrumentation
framework, where the test application can precisely
control the target application. Using instrumentation,
we can create instrumentation of system objects such as
context before the target application is started and control
multiple life cycles of components within the target
application. We can also send User Interface (UI) events
to the application, check application status information
during execution, and so on. The instrumentation
framework enables this functionality by allowing target
and test programs to run in the same process, similar to
the hook mechanisms. We can use this mechanism to
dynamically analyze target applications.

3

System Design and Implementation

Our system consists of three main processes, including
static code, dynamic, and result analyses. The
metadata analysis in static analysis decompiles the
executable file of an Android application to obtain
basic metadata information. Then, we can preliminarily
obtain permissions, components, and other securityrelated information of the application in a lightweight
analysis process. Further, we analyze the transmission
path of the data of interest within the application by
data flow analysis. To overcome the false alarm and
omission of static analysis, further verify the results
of static analysis, and detect security vulnerabilities
triggered only by actual operation, we propose a dynamic
analysis method based on the executable script and API
hooks. The result analysis process needs to aggregate
the static and dynamic analysis results, generating
the final security vulnerability analysis results. Our
hybrid method takes advantage of both static and
dynamic analyses. Compared with running these two
methods independently, our method is more accurate
and comprehensively detects security vulnerabilities in
Android applications. Figure 1 shows the architecture of
detection system.
3.1
3.1.1

Vulnerability judgment rules
Vulnerability pattern

We use formal language to describe the corresponding
vulnerability pattern instead of natural language. First,
a few definitions are given below. The security
vulnerability patterns are formally described as follows:
V D .v1 ; v2 ; v3 ; v4 /
(1)
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Fig. 1

Architecture of detection system.

where V represents the security vulnerability in Android
applications, v1 denotes the security vulnerability type,
v2 refers to the number of security vulnerability of
this type in the application, v3 indicates specific
vulnerability information or vulnerability evidence, and
v4 corresponds to the specific method for detecting this
vulnerability.
Definition 1. Vulnerability based on metadata analysis
means that these types of vulnerability information
are detected by static metadata analysis. The main
techniques include conditional judgment and string
regular matching.
For example, an application might possess the security
vulnerability of insecure JavaScript in WebView. We
express the vulnerability as V D .insecure JavaScript
in WebView, 1, the addjavascriptInterface function is
called in the application and the unsafe JavaScript
function may lead to JavaScript injection attack,
metadata analysis).
Definition 2. Vulnerability based on data flow analysis
means that these types of vulnerability information are
detected by static data flow analysis.
Definition 2.1. Source refers to the acquisition point
of sensitive data, which is mainly the API function for
acquiring sensitive data (such as getInstalledPackages).
Sink is the data transmission point, which is mainly
a function for data storage, transmission, and other
operations.
Definition 2.2. A data transmission path usually refers
to a program code execution path connecting the source
and sink points; it can be an edge of the data flow graph
considered in the study.
Definition 2.3. The vulnerability path represents the
propagation path of sensitive data in the application,
including the data acquisition point and the data leakage
point. It can be expressed as a triple hsource, sink, data
transmission pathi.
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For example, we perform a static analysis on the
application and discover that the application may possess
the security vulnerability of loading code from the
outside using the class loader technique. We express
the vulnerability as V D .dynamically loading file, 1, a
path p about dynamically loading file exists, data flow
analysis).
Definition 3. Vulnerability based on dynamic analysis
means that these types of vulnerability information are
detected by dynamic executable script and API hook
techniques.
3.1.2

Matching rules

Our vulnerability rule is a set of description
specifications based on safety experience and defined in
the form of the above formalized expressions. Table 1
shows the nine important security vulnerabilities that are
considered in the present study.
Table 1 Vulnerability pattern.
Type of
vulnerability
Vulnerability description (v3 )
detected (v1 )
The component properties in the
Unrestricted application are improperly set,
component causing the component to be
Metadata
invoked illegally.
analysis
Insecure
The unsafe JavaScript function
JavaScript in used in the application may lead
WebView
to JavaScript injection attack.
Sensitive data There is a path consisting of
processed in defined sources and sinks about
plaintext
the sensitive data.
Privacy leak The logcat interface is called to
by log
output sensitive data as logs.
There is a path consisting of
Dynamically defined sources and sinks about
loading file dynamically loading file during
runtime.
Use a simple reversible encoding
Data flow
Insecure
function to encrypt or hard-code
analysis
password
the secret keys into the code.
Other applications construct
intents that contain malicious
Intent exposure content to launch components
exposed by the vulnerable
application.
Use SQLite without proper type
Structured
detection and validation of the
Query
parameters passed in the SQL
Language
(SQL) inject statement.
Input for the login or registration
Dynamic Input unverified UI of the application is not
analysis
validated legally.
Detection
process
(v4 )

The vulnerability named unrestricted component
refers to the unreasonable setting of the component
properties in Android applications; it may cause the
component to be illegally called. The Android: exported
attribute in its Androidmanifest.xml file is simply set
to be true with no valid permissions to restrict the
other applications’ components from calling it. The
insecure JavaScript in WebView vulnerability means
that applications with WebView have the ability to
communicate between JavaScript code and native code
through event response function and other methods. If
unsecure JavaScript functions are used, it may lead
to JavaScript injection attack and expose the sensitive
resources obtained by the application to unknown
web content. The sensitive data processed in plaintext
refers to the situation that applications process sensitive
information in unencrypted plaintext in various ways.
In addition, we separately list the situations in which
the application calls the logcat interface and outputs
sensitive data as logs as the privacy leak by log
vulnerability. The vulnerability named dynamically
loading file means that the application invokes various
techniques to load files from outside itself during
running. For example, many applications use dynamic
code loading to load external code or Android Package
(APK) files through methods such as DexClassLoader.
This has been proven that it may lead to malicious
code execution. At the same time, if the application
uses shell commands or techniques such as Native
Development Kit (NDK) and libraries written in C/C++,
we will consider that this application may also feature
such type of vulnerabilities. Security vulnerabilities
can also occur if an insecure password is used in an
application. These situations can be that the application
uses a simple reversible encoding function to encrypt,
or simply hard-code the secret keys into the code
without any protections, and so on. Intent exposure
refers to the fact that other applications can start an
application and make it perform dangerous operations by
constructing intents containing malicious content using
the components exposed by the target applications. If
the IntentFilter information of the application is not
configured properly, it is easy for other applications
to exploit the vulnerability to attack. SQL inject
vulnerabilities are also possible in Android applications.
The application may use SQLite (a lightweight database
on the Android platform) without proper type detection
and validation of the parameters passed in the SQL
statement. This condition can lead to collisions and

Junwei Tang et al.: A Novel Hybrid Method to Analyze Security Vulnerabilities in Android Applications

database leaks. Another type of vulnerability involves
user input. If the information entered by the user is
incorrectly validated by the application, it may cause
serious consequences, such as program logic failure
and application sensitive information leakage. We focus
on the input to the login and registration UI of the
application here. Validation of input information on other
UIs can be extended in the future.
3.2
3.2.1

Static analysis
Metadata analysis

Metadata analysis mainly uses decompiling technology
to obtain the metadata information of Android
applications. Android applications are usually developed
in Java language, compiled into dex format files, and
run in Android virtual machine instances. However,
the packing technology causes considerable difficulty to
directly reverse the analysis.
First, we extract and analyze the AndroidManifest.xml
file. This file contains metadata, such as application
permission request, component construction, and main
activity. In the subsequent data flow analysis, we map
the different elements to the corresponding Java objects
based on these metadata, and complete the analysis and
detection of the vulnerabilities in accordance with the
vulnerability judgment rules.
The binary code (APK file) is decompiled into a
folder containing a bytecode file named dex.class. We
decompile the code into smali format code, which can be
further decompiled into Java code. However, this Java
code will miss several program semantic information
and may increase the probability of decompilation
failure. Thus, we analyze the permissions, components,
and other related security vulnerabilities of Android
applications directly from the smali code. Through this
intermediate bytecode form, we can directly analyze
whether unsafe functions are called in the application
through string regular matching. The comprehensive
use of Static Android Analysis Framework (SAAF)[4] ,
AXMLPrinter2[5] , and baksmali[6] can effectively obtain
highly readable and semantically complete bytecode
files. The combination of various decompiler tools can
effectively improve the decompiler’s success rate.
3.2.2 Data flow analysis
The core of the static data flow analysis is to track
the information of the marked tainted data, analyze
its possible propagation paths, and then perform the
corresponding processing. The main principle is to mark
the data of interest as “tainted”. Thus, a series of new
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data is generated through operations, such as arithmetic
and logic operations, and will inherit the “tainted or not”
property of the source data. In this manner, operations,
such as jump, call, and assignment of tainted data, are
analyzed to build the corresponding propagation path of
tainted data.
Soot[7] is the classic Java code data flow analysis
tool. FlowDroid[8] expands Soot to the information flow
analysis of Android applications. FlowDroid transforms
Android applications that are based on component life
cycle and callback function running mechanism into
a Java program based on a dummy main function.
Based on the prepared source and sink, sensitive data
flow analysis can be performed for the entire Android
application. Whether a path in the application starts
with the defined source point and ends with the sink
point must be determined. The existence of such a
path can indicate that the application features the
corresponding security vulnerabilities. This path is called
the vulnerability path.
We extend the ideas of detecting such sensitive
data leakage, and enrich the range of source and sink
points. We have defined several functions that are unsafe
for our own application scenarios as source and sink
points. This data flow analysis can determine whether
vulnerability paths caused by the use of sequences of the
corresponding functions exist. Based on the expansion of
the above tools, we mark the sensitive information and
use static taint analysis technology to obtain the possible
propagation path of the taint information to determine
whether a vulnerability path exists in the application.
3.3
3.3.1

Dynamic vulnerability analysis
Dynamic executable script

(1) Script generation
We implement an automated test method to drive the
target application to execute a customized test path. Two
kinds of approaches are used for Android automated
testing. One is based on the UIAutomator, and can only
simulate and trigger corresponding events to operate
on the target application but cannot directly obtain
the attributes of each element of the target application
to operate. The other kind of approach is based on
the instrumentation framework, in which the process
being tested and the target application are run as two
threads in the same process. Without triggering any
events, the individual elements can be accessed internally
and the corresponding data can be modified. We select

594

the second method and extend our system based on
Robotium[9] , which is an open source automated testing
framework using instrumentation. Cafe[10] is based on
Robotium with more features and supports real-time
recording of user actions in target applications. We
perform a secondary encapsulation on the Cafe to further
simplify its complex operations and generate custom
executable scripts.
We can create rich test cases with instances of the
solo object in Robotium. The core difficulty of the
dynamic vulnerability analysis is how to reduce the
manual operation but achieve a more intelligent and
automated generation of executable scripts and drive
the target application to run the corresponding program
logic. By extending the Cafe framework, we have
completed the automatic generation of manual operation
script and accurately recorded the manual operations.
In this way, we not only avoid the tediousness and
mistakes of writing scripts manually but also expand our
analysis system on the basis of such scripts. The basic
script can be modified based on different vulnerability
analysis requirements to complete a more efficient
dynamic analysis. The main idea of the automatic
recording and generating script is to continuously listen
to various operations (including clicking, sliding, and
input, etc.) on the view of the target application, and then
automatically generate corresponding codes based on
the API representation provided by Robotium according
to the types of each operation and widget. The view
represents an area of the interface that the current user
inspects, and it can contain multiple widgets that can
interact with the user. For cases where the widget is
not recognized, we can use coordinates-based click
operation instead. The scripts based on coordinate
may not be accurate enough, thus causing failure of
operations.
We design new executable scripts to be expressed
in the XML format. As shown in Fig. 2, a script
mainly contains the main activity and package name
information of the target application and the test case
information based on the individual operation events
of Robotium. These operational events can be clicks,
inputs, swipes, waits, screenshots, and so on. The
tag TestCases can contain multiple TestCase tags. The
attributes in a TestCase tag contain the name of the
TestCase, whereas the contents of the tag contain various
action events, which are generated automatically by our
script generation module. We can extend and modify
these generated basic scripts in accordance with the
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<TestSuite>
<targetInfo>
<actname name="mainActivity "/>
<pacname name="targetPackage "/>
</targetInfo>
<TestCases>
<TestCase name="Case0">
Click event
Input event
Swiping event
Wait
…
</TestCase>
<TestCase name="Case1">
…
</TestCase>
…
</TestCases>
</TestSuite>

Fig. 2

Dynamic script in XML format.

corresponding requirements of security vulnerability
analysis. For example, these changes could include the
addition of clicks, swiping actions, modification of the
input, inclusion of a delay interval of two steps, looping
actions, and so on.
(2) Script execution
The process of script execution enables the target
application to reproduce the various operations written
in our scripts. The main principles are instrumentation
and the Android test project (Android developer
documentation now recommends AndroidJUnitRunner
instead of the Android test project). The test application
connects the target applications with the instrumentation
tags in its manifest.xml file. The targetPackage attribute
determines the package name of the target application.
The test and target applications interact through
InstrumentationTestRunner and run in the same process.
In general, applications with different signatures run in
their own independent Dalvik process. Thus, using the
same signature to re-sign the test application, the target
application is necessary.
In general, the life cycle of components is controlled
by the Android system. Functions, such as onCreate,
onResume, and onStop in the activity life cycle, are all
called by the system itself, and the Android application
framework provides no APIs with the permissions for
users to call directly. However, by using instrumentation,
we can create instrumentation of system objects, such as
context, before the target application is formally started.
We can control the life cycle of the components in the
target application, generate and send simulated user and
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system events to the target application, and monitor the
running states at the same time.
Our script execution module automatically generates
the corresponding Android test project based on
instrumentation and extracts the corresponding content
of the script. Then, the corresponding Java code
of the Android test project is generated. After
automatically compiling the project with the command
line compilation tool, we generate the test APK file.
After installing both the test and target APK files and
passing the information of the main activity of the
target application when launching the test application,
the script drives the target application to perform the
correspondiung operations. Figure 3 shows the principle
of dynamic executable scripts.
3.3.2

Hook and analyze related methods

To document important information about security
vulnerabilities at runtime, we use the Xposed[11]
framework to hook related important methods to record
information about these vulnerabilities. For example,
we hook the findClass method in BaseDexClassLoader
and record the call of this function, and then verify
the existence of the vulnerability in accordance with
our vulnerability patterns. Through our dynamic script,
the target application is automatically driven, and
several running state information is recorded during
the execution process to comprehensively verify the
existence of the vulnerability. The hook APIs, call
records, and other information to be recorded can be
defined based on a specific vulnerability pattern. These
information can be easily expanded on the basis of the
requirements of verification vulnerabilities.
3.4

Result analysis

The results of our vulnerability detection system based
on the hybrid analysis approach are obtained by
synthesizing the information of the above analysis
$QGURLGvLUWXDOmDFKLQHpURFHVV

5HVLJQZLWK
 WKHsDPH
sLJQDWXUH

Drive

,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ7HVW5XQQHU
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([HFXWDEOHsFULSW

<TestCase>
…
</TestCase>

7HVW$3.EDVHGRQ$QGURLG
tHVWpURMHFW
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5RERWLXP

&RPSLOH
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Fig. 3

process. Among the analysis approaches, the static
analysis will give a considerable part of the vulnerability
analysis results. Meanwhile, the dynamic analysis
plays two roles: It not only performs further dynamic
validation of partial results of static analysis but also
analyzes several types of vulnerabilities that are hard to
be detected directly by static analysis.
Static analysis cannot detect certain types of
vulnerabilities, and it faces problems such as failure
to verify the existence of vulnerabilities. However,
the dynamic analysis is not only expensive but also
difficult to detect certain types of security vulnerabilities.
Our hybrid method can avoid these shortcomings.
Avoidance of such issues is the difference between our
hybrid method and running two independent analyses.
The whole process makes our hybrid approach more
comprehensive and effective than individual analysis
methods.

4
4.1

Evaluation
Dataset and success rate of decompilation

Table 2 shows the overall situation of the metadata and
data flow analyses of our detection system. As long as
the decompilation is successful, we can perform the
metadata and data flow analyses normally. The results
show that the success rate of static analysis of our
detection system reaches 99.65% on average.
4.2

Vulnerability detection

To evaluate the vulnerability detection effect of our
system, we have designed several experiments to test
the static and dynamic analyses of the whole system,
and point out two application scenarios of our dynamic
executable scripts, including further verification of
results of static analysis and detection of vulnerabilities
that are hard to be detected by static analysis alone.
Finally, by combining with all the results, we give the
overall analysis situation of our system.
Table 2

7DUJHW$3.

Principle of dynamic executable scripts.
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Dataset and percentage of successful static analysis.

5560
10 194

Number of
successful
decompilations
5547
10 151

Success
rate
(%)
99.97
99.58

56
15 810

56
15 754

100
99.65

Dataset type

Total
number

Drebin
Real-world app
(Google Play and
App store in China)
Developed test apps
Average
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4.2.1

Static analysis results of our system

In this section, we will separately analyze our
static vulnerability detection results on the malicious
application dataset Drebin and our collection of realworld application datasets. Our static analysis can detect
eight types of vulnerabilities.
(1) Static analysis results on Drebin
Among 5560 malicious applications on the Drebin
dataset, our system successfully analyzes 5547 malwares.
Through metadata and data flow analyses, we separately
obtain the number of malicious applications under each
category of vulnerability. Figure 4 shows the distribution
of these numbers. The statistical results show that most
malicious applications have potential vulnerabilities
named unrestricted components. This condition also
proves to a certain extent that malicious applications
considerably reuse codes and call components to each
other. Meanwhile, about a third (31%) of these malicious
apps have vulnerabilities named dynamically loading
file. This finding also shows that many malicious
applications may avoid static detection by separating
parts of the codes. The codes with specific sensitive
features and malicious behaviors are loaded dynamically
at runtime. Applications that use functions to execute
JavaScript code to access local system resources in the
WebView accounts for 27.93% of the total applications.
Numerous studies have proven that calling this interface
in WebView to execute JavaScript code can cause serious
security risks.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of applications
with different numbers of vulnerabilities in Drebin.
The findings show the presence of 4690 applications
with potential vulnerabilities in 5547 Drebin datasets,
accounting for 84.55%. A total of 43.95% of applications

Fig. 4 Percentage of apps detected for each vulnerability in
Drebin.

Number of vulnerabilities

Fig. 5 Percentage of apps with different numbers of
vulnerabilities in Drebin.

contain one type of vulnerability; 40.60%, two types
of vulnerabilities or more; 13.97%, three types
of vulnerabilities or more; 0.61%, four types of
vulnerabilities or more. No application includes five
or more than five types of vulnerabilities. The analysis
of the 5547 malwares lasts for 2064 s, averaging 4.52 s
per application.
(2) Static analysis results on real-world apps
In total, we have collected 10 194 real-world
applications from various functional categories by the
end of 2017. Most of these applications originate from
Google Play and others from mainstream application
markets of China. Table 3 shows the size and number
distribution of these real-world applications. The average
size of all applications for analysis is 11.15 MB.
The eight types of vulnerabilities are detected by
our static analysis. We successfully analyze 10 151
real-world applications, and all the results are shown
in Fig. 6. Dynamically loading file accounts for
the largest proportion at 57.60%. More than half
of all applications contain another vulnerability, that
is, the unrestricted component. Given that Android
applications are component-based, the interaction
between components can complete complex business
logic. Numerous potential vulnerabilities exist in the
components of Android apps. Notably, about half of
the applications have potential security vulnerabilities
Table 3 Dataset and percentage of successful static analysis
on real-world applications.
Application file Total number of Number of successful
size (MB)
application
analysis applications
0–1
2503
2496
1–10
2514
2497
10–20
3437
3419
>20
1740
1739

Percentage (%)
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Type of vulnerabilities

Fig. 6 Percentage of real-world apps detected for each
vulnerability.

Average time (s)

that leak private data through log messages. Developers
might leave behind the logs for the convenience of
debugging during the development. In addition, these
remaining logs can be obtained by an attacker, which
results in a privacy leakage. The applications with the
vulnerability named insecure JavaScript in WebView,
which executes JavaScript code through the API of
the WebView component, also accounts for about onethird of these applications. This condition also shows
that as more applications start to use WebView, the
proportion of hybrid applications will increase. This kind
of vulnerability of sensitive data processed in plaintext
is a situation that requires attention. This vulnerability
accounts for one-third of the total and causes serious user
privacy leaks. Developers need to pay more attention
to the security of sensitive data transmission in their
applications and avoid direct plaintext data processing.
Figure 7 illustrates the average time of these 10 151
applications, that is, the average consumption time of
static analysis for applications of different sizes. The

Size of applications

Fig. 7 Average time for static analysis of applications of
different sizes.
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average time of static analysis for these applications
can increase gradually with the increase in their sizes.
However, after reaching a certain size, the static
analysis time will not increase dramatically. After
exceeding 20 MB, the average analysis time of the
application decreases compared with the previous 10–
20 MB applications, because most of these applications
are probably just a bit over 20 MB in size. At the same
time, the portion of the increase in file size may be
resource files, which we disregard in our static analysis,
rather than program codes. Thus, this condition causes
no increase in the final static analysis time.
The average analysis time for 0–1 MB applications
is about 19 s. Beyond 1 MB, the average analysis time
quickly rises to over 100 s. In general, the larger the
application, the greater the amount of code is. Therefore,
the more complex metadata analysis and data flow
analysis required, the longer it will take. The average
static analysis time for all applications is 92.02 s.
From Fig. 8, we can statistically analyze the potential
security vulnerabilities in applications of different sizes.
For applications of different sizes, the eight types
of vulnerabilities exhibit different distributions. For
smaller applications, the highest percentage of potential
vulnerabilities is that of the unrestricted component
type. As for larger applications, the main security
vulnerability is the dynamically loading file. The main
reason for this result is that smaller applications may
perform various functions that need to interact with the
outside world. Thus, component interfaces may need to
be open to others. However, larger applications may need
additional code to execute, and their business logic is
more complex. Figure 8 also shows that with the increase
in application size, the percentage of various potential
vulnerabilities in applications gradually increases in
most cases.
As shown in Fig. 9, on average, 83.46% of
applications have potential security vulnerabilities. More
than 60% of applications contain two or more types
of vulnerabilities, and applications with one type of
vulnerability account for 19.31%. More information
can be obtained by classifying these applications based
on their sizes. For applications smaller than 1 MB,
the percentage of vulnerable applications (61.90%)
is considerably lower than the average percentage of
all applications. The percentage of applications larger
than 1 MB containing security vulnerabilities is notably
higher (more than 87%). For applications with sizes
less than 1 MB, the proportion containing one type of
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Percentage (%)

598

Type of vulnerabilities

Vulnerability distribution for each category of applications of different sizes.

Percentage (%)

Fig. 8

Number of vulnerabilities

Fig. 9

Distribution of number of vulnerability in applications of different sizes.

vulnerability is higher than that with multiple types.
The opposite is true for applications larger than 1 MB.
Moreover, as the size of applications increases, the
proportion of applications containing potential security
vulnerabilities also increases, whereas the proportion of
applications containing only one type of vulnerabilities
relatively decreases. That is, the larger the application,
the more likely it is to contain multiple types of security
vulnerabilities.
4.2.2

Evaluate the accuracy of static analysis by
a labeled dataset and dynamic executable
scripts

First, we have developed a labeled application dataset
containing various security vulnerabilities and evaluated
the accuracy of our system based on this dataset. Next,

we run real-world applications with potential security
vulnerabilities detected by static analysis dynamically
through our executable scripts, collect their runtime
information, and further verify the accuracy of our static
analysis for real-world applications.
(1) Accuracy on our labeled set
We have developed applications with corresponding
security vulnerabilities and verified the accuracy of
the detection system based on the correct detection of
the corresponding vulnerabilities. The specific results
are described in Table 4. The experimental results
can confirm that the static analysis of our system is
highly effective and can accurately detect the potential
vulnerabilities of 56 applications in our test set.
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Table 4
Vulnerability type

Static analysis results on our labeled dataset.
Number of test applications with corresponding
type of vulnerability

Unrestricted component
Sensitive data processed in plaintext
Privacy leak by log
Dynamically loading file
Insecure password
Intent exposure
SQL inject
Insecure JavaScript in WebView
Normal applications without above vulnerabilities

(2) Further verify accuracy of static analysis for realworld applications by dynamic scripts
We can further confirm the existence of vulnerabilities
by taking advantage of the results of static analysis and
driving the application to run in accordance with specific
executable scripts. We randomly select 20 real-world
applications for each vulnerability category detected by
static analysis for dynamic verification.
To achieve compatibility with more target applications,
we use scripts based on coordinates rather than
widgets. First, a target application is manually operated,
and the script generation module automatically generates
a corresponding executable script. We can apply the
basic script in the coordinate format to other target
applications without modification or minor modifications
(usually replacing the package name and the starting
activity name). This avoids substantial manual work. The
dynamic scripts primarily enable the applications to
execute specific operations of UIs. Finally, combined
with information on API hooks and vulnerability
patterns, the final verification is completed.
Our static analysis can detect numerous types of
vulnerabilities. However, after careful assessment, we
have found that not all vulnerabilities need to be further
verified, which is a huge and unnecessary workload.
The judgment rules of certain vulnerability patterns are
Table 5
Core logic of dynamic script
Scripts drive applications to execute
their general business processes.
Scripts drive applications to execute
their general business processes as
much as possible.
Script drives the application to execute
to the WebView and perform the
actions in the interface.
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Number of applications
detected

15
12
3
9
7
2
3
3
2

15
12
3
9
7
2
3
3
0

very simple (such as unrestricted component). We need
to focus on and verify the security vulnerabilities with
more complex vulnerability pattern and are prone to
incorrect judgment by the program. In the end, we further
verify the following three types of vulnerability detection
results through dynamic executable scripts.
Table 5 records our core ideas for validating
applications that may contain the three types of
vulnerabilities by dynamic executable scripts and API
hooks. We use the dynamic executable scripts to drive
the application execution, hook the corresponding
system function in the execution, and record its running
status. The results are as shown in Table 6. The
data shows that our system static analysis detects
vulnerabilities in real-world applications with high
accuracy.
4.2.3 Detect other types of security vulnerabilities
by dynamic analysis
Given the limited accuracy of static analysis and the
incompleteness of vulnerability pattern, certain security
vulnerabilities cannot be easily detected by static
analysis technology alone. The dynamic executable
script analysis can directly run the target application,
drive it to execute the corresponding program logic that
may trigger the vulnerability, and finally, complete the
detection and judgment of the vulnerability.

Dynamic analysis logic of 3 types of vulnerability.
Vulnerability
type
Privacy leak by
log

Running status record

Hook relative APIs function

Record the logcat of the app.

Log

Record the dynamic file loading
of the application.

Runtime.exec ClassLoader
ApplicationPackageManager

Dynamically
loading file

Record the javascript code
called from the WebView.

Addjavascriptinterface

Insecure
JavaScript in
WebView
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Table 6

Vulnerability type for dynamic
validation
Privacy leak by log
Dynamically loading file
Insecure JavaScript in WebView

Results of dynamic verification.
Number of applications that are
Number of applications
dynamically verified for
detected by static analysis
vulnerabilities
20
20
20
19
20
19

We use the input unverified vulnerability as an
example to illustrate the specific analysis of the
vulnerability by our dynamic scripts. The types of
vulnerabilities that can be analyzed by dynamic scripts
rather than static analysis can be extended and are not
limited to this type of vulnerability. Figure 10 describes
the core script used for testing whether an application
has input unverified vulnerability.
First, we use the script generation module to record all
our manual operations on the target application. We
correctly input the required information. Thus, the
application completes the input successfully, jumps
to the subsequent processes, and finally, generates an
executable script for the whole processes. This condition
requires a small amount of manual work. Here, we
focus on the input verification of the login or registration
interfaces.
Then, we arbitrarily construct the input information
(one can manually modify the script, or the script
generation module automatically generates the input
text based on certain rules) and continuously update
the newly generated base script. More updated scripts
may be present. The updated scripts keep the application
running. As long as the arbitrarily constructed input
information (neither the standard required e-mail
information nor phone number information, etc.) can
also pass the verification and enter the subsequent
process, we determine that the application has an input
unverified vulnerability.
We dynamically analyze 20 applications known to
have the input unverified vulnerability by our dynamic
scripts and API hooks. Only one of the 20 target
…
<TestCases>
<TestCase name="Case0">
…
<TestAction name="test.enterText(0, “information to verify”, false);"/>
<TestAction name="test.recordReplay.clickOn(“id/button”, “0”, false);"/>
…
</TestCase>
…
</TestCases>
</TestSuite>

Fig. 10

A script for analyzing input unverified.

Accuracy of static
analysis for real-world
apps (%)
100
95
95

applications failed in the analysis. Further analysis shows
that one of the application analyses failed because the
application added measures that caused the re-signature
to fail. Given that our dynamic script is based on the
instrumentation, it cannot be dynamically executed if the
re-signature fails.
4.3

Comparison with existing systems

Table 7 lists the specific comparison between our
system and previous relevant studies, where extension
required means that the system cannot be directly
used to detect this type of vulnerability, and extension
development is needed. And partial means that for
the types of vulnerabilities in Table 7, FlowDroid and
the method in Ref. [12] do not detect all cases, and
there may be other vulnerability situations. FlowDroid
can directly detect partial sensitive data leaks. The
analyzed vulnerability categories in Ref. [12] partially
overlap with the “insecure password” vulnerability. The
vulnerability categories detected by our system are
relatively more comprehensive. Moreover, our dynamic
analysis can further verify the existence of vulnerabilities
and detect more types of vulnerabilities.

5

Limitation and Discussion

Our static analysis process, similar to most static analysis
Table 7

Comparison with existing systems.
Our
Ref.
Item
FlowDroid
system
[12]
p
Unrestricted component


Sensitive data processed
p
Partial

in plaintext
p
Privacy leak by log
Extension required

p
Dynamically loading file
Extension required

p
Insecure password
Extension required Partial
p
Intent exposure
Extension required

p
SQL inject
Extension required

Insecure JavaScript in
p


WebView
p
Input unverified


Can dynamically verify
p


some vulnerabilities?
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systems, cannot handle several packed applications.
Given that our system is extended and improves the early
version of FlowDroid, it also features the corresponding
limitations, such as excessive time consumption and
false positives. In addition, if certain measures, such
as signature verification mechanism, are added into the
application, the re-signed application cannot be opened
and run normally, which will result in the failure of our
dynamic executable scripts. Expectedly, if we have a
source code for the target application, no such problem
would occur. In the future, we can improve our system
to adapt to more applications.

6

Related Work

Most previous vulnerability analyses focused on static
analysis. CHEX[13] is an Android application static
analysis framework, which can analyze the data flow of
Android applications and find the component hijacking
vulnerability. Zhou and Jiang[1] mainly focused on
content provider component and discovered two security
vulnerabilities related to content providers, namely,
passive content leak and content pollution, which may
lead to the privacy data leakage in Android applications.
However, they only focused on the vulnerabilities of
content provider component, which have been patched
by subsequent applications and systems.
Liu et al.[14] pointed out that current Android
applications widely apply a deep link, that is, clicking
a link can directly jump to a certain content page in
the application; however, this technology faces the
risk of being hijacked. To resist hijacking attacks
and navigate to the right target content page of the
Android application, we need to correctly use the
legitimately validated deep link technology. Aonzo et
al.[15] pointed out that the problem of phishing attacks
is far from being solved. Existing Android password
manager app and instant apps may run the risk of
phishing attacks. Phishing attacks essentially exploit
a vulnerability in the password manager application, and
Aonzo et al.[15] offered a solution. However, the solution
is only limited to this category of problems and cannot
analyze the situation of multiple types of vulnerabilities
in Android applications. Clickshield[16] indicates that
existing solutions from academia and industry do not
solve click-hijacking on mobile devices. Muslukhov et
al.[12] reported that numerous Android applications use
Java encryption methods incorrectly, resulting in security
vulnerabilities in Android applications. Experiments
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showed that the third party library is the main source
of this situation. Pariwono et al.[17] indicated that the
discarded internet resources of Android applications can
be used as the raw material for attackers to analyze
and exploit vulnerabilities in Android applications.
Uipicker[18] can automatically detect sensitive input
operations, identify semantic information through layout
information and program code, and further analyze the
location where security-related information will appear.
Several studies are also based on dynamic analysis.
Zhang et al.[19] proposed a kind of attack called
“transplantation attack”, which enables a malicious app to
secretly capture private photos and bypass the API audit
process of the Android system. Zhang et al.[20] were the
first to put forward the runtime-information-gathering
problem, which refers to the application’s continuous
collection of users’ private information when running.
TaintDroid[2] adds a taint mark to the source of privacy
data and then dynamically tracks the spread of taint
data through program variables, files, and inter-process
communication messages. Finally, when the taint data
leak out of the system through the network, they will
generate a log record and remind users that the privacy
data are leaked by the application. Considerable dynamic
taint analysis work is based on this tool.
Instead of directly detecting the component
vulnerabilities of Android applications, Ma et al.[21]
determined whether there is a component hijacking
attack by detecting the sensitive behavior of the
applications. They transformed the problem of detecting
component hijacking into a problem of determining
whether the inter-component communication graph
contains a given path. The effectiveness of this
method was proven by analyzing 57 real-world
applications. Several malicious applications are targeted
because of important security vulnerabilities. In
addition to traditional machine learning methods for
detecting malicious applications, Droiddetector[22] takes
advantage of deep learning technology to detect Android
malwares. The extracted features include static and
dynamic features, and the results show that the method
can achieve high accuracy. Yan et al.[23] extracted the
abstract syntax tree features of the Javascript code in
applications and used the deep learning classification
model for training. This method detects code injection
attacks from Android hybrid applications with an
accuracy of 97.55%. Maier et al.[24] pointed out that
many malicious applications adopt a split-personality
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behavior to hide malicious codes to avoid detection of
antivirus software. Malicious applications use more
dynamic code loading techniques than benign ones.
In a summary, the existing methods described
above do not comprehensively consider the overall
vulnerability analysis of the entire Android application,
and the scope of their influence is limited.
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[4]

[5]

7

Conclusion

We propose a novel hybrid approach for analyzing
security vulnerabilities in Android applications. Our
hybrid approach takes advantage of both static and
dynamic analyses, and performs better than running
two independent analyses. Our static analysis combines
metadata and data flow analyses, whereas dynamic
analysis consists of executable scripts and API hooks.
We can obtain useful security vulnerability information
of target application after our static analysis. Then,
through dynamic executable script and hook API
technology, we can further verify whether this type
of vulnerability exists. In addition, our dynamic
executable scripts can analyze vulnerabilities that
are difficult to be detected by static analysis. We
evaluate our system in detail both on Drebin and realworld applications. The system can effectively detect
nine categories of important security vulnerabilities in
Android applications, and dynamic executable scripts
can avoid most manual operations. In the future, the
detection of our system can also be extended to other
vulnerability types.
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